Case: Edwin A. Acebedo vs. Edd

Case: Edwin A. Acebedo vs. Eddie P. Arquero

Nature: Administrative Case

Facts: On June 1, 1994, Edwin A. Acebedo charged Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Brooke’s Point, Palawan for immorality.
Complainant alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former stenographer of the MTC
Brooke’s Point, and respondent unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as husband and wife at
Bancudo Pulot, Brooke’s Point, Palawan as a result of which a girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero,
was born to the two on May 21, 1989. Attached to the letter-complaint was the girl’s Baptismal
Certificate reflecting the names of respondent and Dedje Irader as her parents
Respondent claimed that the immorality charge by the petitioner was just a mere harassment
and a product of complainnat’s hatred and jealousy. By respondent’s own admission however, he
had an illicit relationship with the petitioner’s wife for 8-9 months. The reason for having this
illicit relationship was explained by the respondent that the petitioner and his wife had a
“kasunduan” in writing and duly notarized. The Kasunduan indicated that they would sever their
marriage ties and allow themselves to live with other possible partner and that no one would go
to court to institute any action against the other.

Issue: Whether or not the “Kasunduan” is enough ground to sever the marriage tie.

Ruling: SC ruled that respondent’s justification fails, being an employee of the judiciary,
respondent ought to have known that the Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the
validity of the marriage between complainant and his wife. Art 1 of the family code provides that
marriage is “an inviolable social institution whose nature and consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation.” It is an institution of public order and policy,
governed by rules established by law which cannot be made inoperative by stipulation of the
parties.
Respondent is suspended for 6 months.
Case: Filipina Sy vs. CA, RTC of San Fernando Pampanga and Fernando Sy
Nature: Petition for Review on Decision of CA (affirmed RTC in denying for the declaration of
nullity of the marriage)
Facts: Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted
marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon
City. Both were then 22 years old.
Their union was blessed with two children. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for
legal separation, before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon
motion of petitioner, the action was later amended to a petition for separation of property on the
grounds that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living
separately for more than one year.
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her
husband, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified that one afternoon, she
went to the dental clinic at Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but operated by his
mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San Fernando, Pampanga. While she was
talking to her son, the boy ignored her and continued playing with the family
computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away from her son, and started
spanking him.
At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son, and punched her in the different
parts of her body. Filipina also claimed that her husband started choking her when she fell on the
floor, and released her only when he thought she was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma
and contusions on different parts of her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision convicted Fernando only of
the lesser crime of slight physical injuries.
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent,
docketed as on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity;
(3) attempt by respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her husband without
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Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine Remulla, Jammy Kate S.
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justifiable cause for more than one year. The Regional Trial Court granted the petition on the
grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal
separation.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of
her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that
the final judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for
separation of property and legal separation, and Fernando’s infliction of physical violence on her
which led to the conviction of her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of
psychological incapacity.
She also cites as manifestations of her husband’s psychological incapacity the following: (1)
habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing to live with his
mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy
himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity of her husband existed
from the time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest thereafter.
RTC and CA denied the declaration for nullity of the marriage of Filipina and Fernando based on
latter’s allegedly psychological incapacity. However, upon this petition, Filipina Yap-Sy contended
that the lower courts overlooked the dates of their marriage ceremony and the issuance of a
marriage license.

Issue: W/N marriage was valid due to absence of marriage license?

Ruling: Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for annulment
of marriage before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and
the celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando
was void from the beginning, she points out that these critical dates were contained in the
documents she submitted before the court.
The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17,
1974, is contained in their marriage contract in her petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court. The date of celebration of their
marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is
admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner’s
petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and private
respondent’s answer admitting it. This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on
January 22, 1993, during her direct examination.
Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed
petitioner did not expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was
incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date
of the issuance of their marriage license. From the documents she presented, the marriage
license was issued on September 17, 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on
November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted
without a marriage license.
These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of
the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal
requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the
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marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in
Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in
Carmona.

Case: Aranes vs. Judge Salavador M. Occiano

Nature: Administrative Complaint

Facts: Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of
the Law. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines
Sur.

Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to
her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at
Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
The judge executed the solemnization of the marriage out of compassion, according to the judge
that he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. However, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and
could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25
kilometers from his residence in Nabua.
Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which
request he acceded. Thereafter he carefully examined the documents submitted to him
by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite
marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to
another date.
However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of
provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion.
He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia
who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the
marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the
marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give
the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply,
respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance
that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage is valid?

Ruling: The territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines
Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not
amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. The court also said that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the
marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or
even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage
license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent
judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this
respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.

Case: Herminia Borja-Manzano vs. Judge Roque Sanchez, MRC, Infanta,
Pangasinan
Nature: Administrative Complaint against Judge Sanchez for Gross Ignorance of Law
Facts:
? Herminia Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano,
having been married to him on May 21, 1966 in Caloocan City. Four children were
born out of that marriage.
? On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda
Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage,
he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage
contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated.”
? Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he
officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano
was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as
husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as
manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him, had he known that the late
Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again;
otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass
him.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal
of the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention
of the Court to two separate affidavits of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were
allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits,
both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to
Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective
marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and
had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge
alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in
question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
Issue: Whether the subsequent marriage of the deceased husband is valid?
Whether the Judge can be charged of Gross Ignorance of Law?
Ruling: No. The subsequent marriage of the late David Manzano with
Luzviminda Payao is null and void, because, even though the two cohabited for seven
years, still both of them had legal impediments to be married again because of their
previous valid marriages. Not all of the requirements of Article 34 (Provision on Legal
Ratification of Marital Cohabitation) are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note
that in the affidavits of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge
himself, expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage.
Yes. Judge Sanchez is guilty of Gross Ignorance of Law. Respondent Judge knew or
ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would
make the subsequent marriage null and void
Note: Article 34 of the Family Code:
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following
requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at
least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at
the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at
least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had
ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal
impediment to their marriage

Case: Engrace Niñal vs. Norma Bayadog
Facts: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on
April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license.
In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that
they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from
securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their
father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to
Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of
action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for “annulment
of marriage” under Article 47 of the Family Code.
The lower court dismissed the action on the ground that petitioners should have filed
the action to declare their father’s marriage to respondent before his death applying
by analogy of Article 47 of the FC (which enumerates the time and the persons who
could initiate fro annulment of marriage)
Issue: Whether or not the second marriage was void ab initio due to the absence of a
marriage license?
Ruling: There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners’ father to respondent
Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. They executed an affidavit stating
that “they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other.
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Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine Remulla, Jammy Kate S.
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The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five
year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license.
Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year
continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully
married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the
cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for
five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the
basis of a cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only missing factor is the
special contract of marriage to validate the union.
In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the
date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence
of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity
meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity that
is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction
as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse.

Case: Lucio Morigo y Cacho vs People of the Philippines
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari (RTC convicted Lucio of Bigamy guilty beyond
reasonable doubt)
Facts:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina
Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
Lucia worked in Singapore and Canada and maintained communication with Lucio.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join
her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at
the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for
divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect
on February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at
the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The
complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on
the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for
judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the
prosecution.
Issue: Whether or not there was a marriage ceremony validating the marriage of
Lucio and Lucia?
Held: The SC found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between
Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of
the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer.
The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles
3 and 4 of the Family Code. This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with;
and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage
In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the
first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused
was, under the eyes of the law, never married. The records show that no appeal was taken
from the decision of the trial court, hence, the decision had long become final and
executory.
Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere
private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus,
needs no judicial declaration of nullity.
Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid
marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in
favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to
ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner
has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the
validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.

Case: Republic of the Philippines vs. Cipriano Orbecido III
Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari regarding the declaration of the capacity of Orbecido III
to remarry by RTC
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Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine Remulla, Jammy Kate S.
June 23, 2009 Case Digests
Facts:
*?Cipriano married Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981
*?In 1986 Myros left for the US, a few years later, Cipriano discovered that Lady Myros had
been naturalized as an American citizen
*?It was in the year 2000 that Cipriano learned from his son that Lady obtained a divorce
decree and then remarried
*?Cipriano thus filed a petition for authority to remarry invoking paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code
*?The RTC granted the petition
*?Hence the present recourse where the Solicitor General argues that the subject provision
only applies in the case of a valid mixed marriage- between a Filipino citizen and an alien
Issue: Does par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code apply in the case of Cipriano?
Ruling: The twin requisites for the application of Par 2 of Art. 26 of the FC are both present in
the case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
The intent of paragraph 2, Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.
The subject provision includes cases involving parties who at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
The respondent must prove to the said divorce as a fact and in accordance with the foreign law,
where Lady is naturalized.

Republic vs. Dayot
GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008
FACTS:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.
HELD:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath”. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.

TITLE: Tenchavez vs. Escano
CITATION: 15 SCRA 355
FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s dad , he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.
ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.
HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys’ fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys’ fees.

SAN LUIS V. SAN LUIS February 6, 2007
(Under Property Regimes of Unions Without Marriage)
Two consolidated cases:
Edgar San Luis v. Felicidad San Luis, Rodolfo San Luis v. Felicidad San LuisBackground:The case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San Luis. During his lifetimeFelicisimo contracted three marriages. From the first marriage contracted in 1942 he had six children, twoof whom are the petitioners in this case. His first wife died in 1963 and his second marriage to anAmerican citizen ended in the wife getting a divorce in 1971. In 1974 Felicismo married Felicidad, therespondent in this case, in the USA. They had no children but lived together for 18 years until Felicismodied in 1992.After Felicisimo¶s death, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets andfiled a petition for letters of administration. The children of Felicisimo from his first marriage opposedthis on the grounds that Felicidad is only a mistress, the second marriage to the American wife subsisting.The petitioners claimed that Article 26, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effectto validate the bigamous marriage because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo¶s legitimatechildren (Article 256 of the Family Code).Issue/Held/Ratio:
Does the respondent Felicidad have legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration?
YES.Even if the Court does not apply Article 26, Par. 2 of the Family Code, there is sufficient jurisprudential basis in the case of
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
[oo nalang kung di niyo maalala ito, guys]where it was held that a Filipino spouse should no longer be considered married if the alien spouse validlyobtains a divorce outside of the Philippines. [Remember that in Van Dorn the Court applied thenationality principle in Article 15 of the Civil Code] Indeed, in cases like Quita v. Dandan and Republicv. Orbecido III [again, kung di niyo maalala, oo nalang, haha] it was pointed out that Par. 2, Article 26 of the Family Code traces its origins to the ruling in Van Dorn.
However,
since Felicidad failed to presentthe necessary evidence to prove the divorce decree (recall Garcia v. Recio: copy of the law, final decreeof absolute divorce) as well as her marriage solemnized in California, the case is remanded to the trialcourt for further reception of evidence.
Ev
en assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry Felicidad
, Felicidad still haslegal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation. Sec. 2, Rule 79 provides (in part) that a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person.
Felicidad qualifies as an interested person with direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their 18-year cohabitation. If she proves the validity of the divorce but fails to prove her marriage, she may beconsidered a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. If she fails to prove the validity of both thedivorce and the marriage, Article 148 of the Family Code would apply. Article 148 states that coupleswho are incapacitated to marry but still live together as husband and wife have co-ownership over properties acquired during their cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions.

Alcantara v. Alcantara(G.R. No.
167746 August 28, 2007)

FACTS:A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner Restituto M. Alcantara against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging thaton December 8, 1982 she and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel, who assisted their wedding for a fee and get married for that same day. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony which was celebrated without themarriage license at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on March 26, 1983. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite,appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with thelocal civil registrar. They then have a child in 1985. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment beissued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file. Respondent praysthat the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit. The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the Respondent, and dismiss the Petitionfor lack of merit.Petitioner then submits at the C.A that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage license because he andrespondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a ³fixer´ who arranged everything for them.
[15]
The wedding took place at the stairsin Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev.Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs.
[16]
He and respondent did not goto Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the respondentwas a resident of the place.ISSUE:1.)

W
as the absence of the marriage license before the marriage shall render the marriage void?2.)

W
hether or not the marriage license issued in Carmona Cavite was valid.HELD:To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on themarriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In thiscase, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number.Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a residentof Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent¶s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license ina city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior tothe completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administrativelyliable.The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario onDecember 8, 1982.Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner — that they appeared before a ³fixer´ who arranged everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev.Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel — will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. Moreover, the solemnizingofficer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizingofficer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said officialhas fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.
WHEREFORE
, premises considered, the instant Petition is
DENIED
for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are
AFFIRMED
. Costs against petitioner.

ANITA B. SAN GABRIEL vs PABLO SAN GABRIEL JR.C.A. No. 23727-R November 27, 1959O.G. May 9, 1960Facts:
Pablo San Gabriel Jr. filed a case for annulment on the ground of irregularities in the accomplishmentof the applications for a marriage license, the issuance of the license and the celebration of themarriage. He claims that his signature on the marriage application is a forgery, that the marriagelicense is invalid because it was not signed by the local civil registrar but by his clerk and that it wasissued in Binangonan, Rizal of which he is not a resident.
Issue:
Valid?
Ruling:
Yes.No other evidence was presented to bolster his self serving claim of forgery. Upon inspection, thesignature on the marriage application is similar to his admitted signature on the marriage contract.The irregularities in the marriage license do not affect the validity of the marriage. Lack of residencealone or the fact that the applications contained false statements would not affect the validity of themarriage.The marriage may not be rendered void by the mere fact that the license was not personally signed bythe Civil Registrar. There was a marriage license and the 10-day publication period was complied with.Furthermore, there is convincing proof that the clerk who signed the marriage license was authorizedto do so by the Civil Registrar.Lastly, the fact that the marriage took place on a Sunday in the office of a Justice of Peace would notnecessarily vitiate the marriage on the ground that it constitutes a violation of the requirement thatthe marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the office of the Judge in open court.